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HUME
AND THE
ETERNITY OF THE WORLD
Gregory L. Reece

^

amuel Clarke exudes all the confidence of Saint Anselm in
his rejection of atheism as a position for fools, though he
recognizes that there may be reasons other than foolish
ness that lead individuals to espouse this foolish position. According to
Clarke there are three possible scenarios relevant to the generation of
atheism. First, someone may be an atheist because they are stupid.
Because being extremely ignorant and stupid, they have never
duly considered any thing at all; nor made any just use of
their natural reason, to discover even the plainest truths; but
have spent their time in a manner of life very little superior
to that of beasts.
Second, someone may be an atheist as a result of the poor state of their
morality.
Because being totally debauched and corrupted in their
practice, they have, by a vicious and degenerate life, cor
rupted the principles of their nature, and defaced the reason
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of their own minds; and...have accustomed themselves only
to mock and scoff at religion.

Finally, atheism may be nothing more than a pretense, assumed by
those who should know better.
Because in the way of speculative reasoning, and upon the
principles of philosophy, they pretend that the arguments
used against the being or attributes of God, seem to them,
after the strictest and fullest inquiry, to be more strong and
conclusive than those by which we endeavour to prove these
great truths.^
One suspects that Clarke means to say that this pretense of rationality
may itself be the result of immorality, if not stupidity.
It is to this third group that Clarke addresses his reasoned defense
of the existence of God and he does so with every reason to suspect that
many in this audience will take his arguments seriously. While Clarke
would come to be a footnote in philosophy, in the early eighteenth
century he was considered one of the giants. Indeed, following the
death of Locke in 1704, Clarke was undoubtedly the most prominent
English-speaking metaphysician. Good friends with Newton, and a
proponent of Newton's physics over those of Descartes, he was asked
to translate Newton's Opticks into Latin in 1706. His correspondence
with Gottfried Leibniz on the subject of natural philosophy and natural
religion were published to much acclaim in 1717. After meeting
Clarke, Voltaire described his intellectual abilities in glowing terms.
Whether or not Clarke proved to have a lasting influence on this
audience is, of course, another matter. While initially received with
great praise, Clarke's crystal clear presentation of the theological proofs
served equally well to provide critics of the theistic hypothesis with a
target for their criticism and attacks. Or, as Anthony Collins said, no
one seriously doubted theexistence of God until Samuel Clarke proved
it. It was Clarke, for example, along with Joseph Butler, whose

' Samuel Clarke, A Demonstration ofthe Beingand Attributes of God, Public Domain Modern
English Text Colleaion (Ann Arbor: University of MichiganHumanities Text Initiative, 1998),
2.
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arguments would come under the scrutiny of David Hume. With the
exception, granted a big exception, of his influence on Kant, Hume
would probably have less impact than Clarke on the English language
philosophical culture of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with
his greatest influence coming later, yet his criticisms of Clarke are
profound and devastating.
In the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume presents a
series of conversations among three characters. The character of Cleanthes presents arguments for the existence of God based on the idea that
there is an analogy between human artifice and the natural world. This
argument would come to be associated with Paley's watchmaker
analogy, but was expressed quite famously by Joseph Butler m Analogy
of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of
Nature of 1736. Though there is enough ambiguity in the character of
Cleanthes to make his identification with Butler less than absolute,
Hume clearly put many of the ideas of Butler into the mouth of this
character. Likewise, the character of Demea seems to express many of
the ideas of Clarke. Though Demea's identification with Clarke may
be even less exact than that of Cleanthes with Butler, Demea frequently
presents arguments and positions with which Clarke would feel right
at home. With the addition of Philo as his own voice (for the most
part) Hume is able to present a careful and critical analysis of the
positions of two of the leading theological philosophers of his day.
In the Dialogues Hume engages Clarke's position on a variety of
levels, perhaps the most significant of which revolves around the
question of the importance of the possibility of the eternity of the
world for the argument for God's existence. Hume has Philo appeal to
the possibility of the world's eternity as an argument against the
conclusiveness of the cosmological argument for the existence of God.
However, Clarke had argued that the cosmological argument does not
depend on a temporally finite world. In this assertion Clarke is in
agreement with Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and the majority of the
classical tradition. According to Clarke, even if we assume the eternity
of the world, its existence still demands explanation. In this essay I
argue that the importance of Hume's response to Clarke in the
Dialogues is found in the way in which the character of Philo develops
a thoroughly modern understanding of causation. Philo can reject the
cosmological argument because his understanding of causation (i.e..
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Hume's understanding of causation) is decidedly different from that of
Clarke and the classical tradition. Of crucial importance is the
difference between Clarke's classical claim that "the cause must be more
excellent than the effect" and Hume's claim in the Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding that "When we infer any particular cause from
an effect, we must proportion the one to the other, and can never be
allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities, but what are exactly
sufficient to produce the effect." With this change in causal theory,
Hxune makes the question of the world's eternity far more significant
than Clarke, and the tradition, had allowed. Hume's Dialogues,
consequently, do more than challengethe traditional arguments for the
existence of God, they move those arguments and their accompanying
debates into the modern world.

^ Clarke's Case for the Existence of God ^
Clarke presents his case for the existence of God in A Discourse
Concerning the Being and Attributes of God. Briefly, his core proposi
tions are as follows.
I: Something must have existed from eternity.
II: There must have existed from eternity one independent
being.
Ill: The one independent being exists necessarily.
IV: The essence of the necessary being is incomprehensible.
V: The necessary being is necessarily eternal.
VI: The necessary being is necessarily infinite and omnipres
ent.
VH: The necessary being is necessarily one.
Vni: The necessary being is necessarily inteUigent.
IX: The necessary being is necessarily free.
X: The necessary being is necessarily omnipotent.
XI: The supreme cause of all things is necessarily omniscient.
XII: The supreme cause of all things is necessarily good.
Of these, numbers 1,11, and III are clearly and directly relevant to the
question of the existence of God and serve to present Clarke's argument
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in its simplest form. It is in the context of Proposition HI that Clarke
first raises the question of the significance of whether the universe is
temporal or eternal. It is also to these propositions that Hume's
challenges to Clarke are most directed. However, it is in Proposition
VIII, with the assertion of the necessary being's necessary intelligence,
that Clarke most fully develops his ideas concerning the relationship of
the existence of God to the question of the eternity of the world. As we
shall see later, Hume has something to say about this proposition as
well.
Let us put first things first, however. Clarke's initial claim is one
that he believes to be without controversy, a foundational statement
with which everyone will agree. The claim is that something must have
existed from eternity. Since it is clear to us that there now exists
something and that this something could not have arisen from nothing
(since we know that nothing can arise from nothing) it is clear that
something always was. Something must have existed from eternity.
Or, as Clarke discusses the claim in terms of causation,
[T]o say a thing is produced, and yet that there is no cause at
all of that production, is to say that something is effected,
when it is effected by nothing; that is, at the same time when
it is not effected at all.-Whatever exists, has a cause, a reason,
a ground of its existence; either in the necessity of its own
nature, and then it must have been of itself eternal; or in the
will of some other being, and then that other being must, at
least in the order of nature and causality, have existed before
it. (Clarke, Demonstration, 8)
Clarke's argument, we see, is based upon his claim that we have a priori
knowledge about the nature of causation. We know that everything has
a cause and that nothing may arise from nothing. Therefore something
has always existed.
Hume's character of Demea, clearly standing for Clarke, echoes
this position when he says, "The (existence of God) is self evident.
Nothing exists without a cause; and the original cause of this universe
(whatever it be) we call God."^ Demea, like Clarke, is careful at this
' David Hume, Dialogties Concerning Natural Relipon, Part n.
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point not to make any claims about the eternally existing thing. It
would appear that it could be identified as either the Godhead or the
universe itself. The point is that something, whatever it is, clearly must
exist eternally. If there is something, there has always been something.
Hume elaborates Demea's position in Part IX of the Dialogues in
a way that makes the argument point more clearly toward a theistic
conclusion. Demeasays,
Whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence;
it being absolutely impossible for anything to produce itself,
or be the cause of its own existence. In mounting up;
therefore, from effects to causes, we must either go on tracing
an infinite succession, without any ultimate cause at all; or
must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause, that is
necessarily existent. Now that the first supposition is absurd
may be thus proved. In the infinite chain or succession of
causes and effects, each single effect is determined to exist by
the power and efficacy of that cause which immediately
preceded; but the whole eternal chain or succession, taken
together, is not determined or caused by anything: and yet it
is evident that it requires a cause or reason, as much as any
particular object, which begins to exist in time.
Once again, Hume's Demea is clearly echoing an argument put forward
by Clarke. Drawing upon Wollaston's The Religion of Nature Delin
eated, Clarke makes his case.
This matter has been well illustrated by a late able writer.Suppose a chain hung down out of the heavens, from an
unknown height; and, though every link of it gravitated
toward the earth, and what it hung upon was not visible, yet
it did not descend, but kept its situation: And, upon this, a
question should arise. What supported or kept up this chain?
Would it be a sufficient answer to say, that the first or lowest
link hung upon the second, or that next above it; the second,
or rather the first and second together, upon the third; and so
on in infinitum? For, what holds up the whole? A chain of
ten links, would fall down, unless something able to bear it
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hindered: One of twenty, if not stayed by something of a yet
greater strength, in proportion to the increase of weight. And
therefore one of infinite links, certainly; if not sustained by
something infinitely strong, and capable to bear up an infinite
weight: And thus it is in a chain of causes and effects, tending,
or (as it were) gravitating, towards some end. The last, or
lowest, depends, or, (as one may say) is suspended upon the
cause above it. This, again, if it be not the first cause, is
suspended, as an effect, upon something above it, &c. And if
they should be infinite, unless (agreeably to what has been
said) there is some cause, upon which all hang or depend, they
would be but an infinite effect without an efficient: and to
assert there is any such thing, would be as great an absurdity
as to say, that a finite or little weight wants something to
sustain it, but an infinite one (or the greatest) does not.
(Clarke, Demonstration, 12)
The step from Proposition I to Proposition II is thus made by Clarke.
Something must have existed eternally but this eternal something must
be different from the chain of cause and effect. Each effect has its origin
in its preceding cause, but this does not explain the existence of the
chain in its entirety. Clarke argues that an eternal chain of cause and
effect still begs a causal explanation.
Hume has the character of Cleanthes respond to this argument of
Demea/Clarke. According to Cleanthes when one is tracing an eternal
succession of objects it makes no sense to inquire concerning a first
cause. Once we have explained the cause of each particular object or
event there is nothing left to be explained. If one were shown the
particular causes of each particle in a collection of twenty, it makes no
sense to inquire concerning the cause of the entire collection. The
individual explanations for the individual objects are all the explana
tions it is logical to seek. If the world is truly eternal, then one need
look nor further for its cause.
One suspects, however, that Clarke would not be satisfied with
this response. Clarke, as we will see, has no objection to the existence
of an eternal succession of objects or events. He would no doubt agree
that it makes no sense to inquire after the kind of thing that Hume has
Cleanthes object to. Clarke isn't inquiring after the first cause in a
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series of causes, and even if it were possible to have such in an eternal
succession, this is not what he is seeking. Clarke is struck, it seems to
me, in the same way that many people are struck, by the bare fact of the
existence of things. The cause he seeks is not a link in the chain, not
even the first link. It is not that kind of cause at all. Clarke's contention
is that in order to come to an end of our explanation we must settle
upon something that has the explanation of its eternal existence within
itself. This is not true of any link in the chain. It is theoretically
possible, for Clarke, that the universe itself contains the cause of its own
existence, that there is no need to go beyond the tzniverse for its
explanation, as Hume has Cleanthes suggest. But if this is the case, it
has to be shown, it cannot be just asserted. Clarke makes this point as
his third proposition.
That unchangeable and independent Being, which has existed
from eternity, without any external cause of its existence,
must be self-existent, that is, necessarily existing. For what
ever exists, must either have come into being out of nothing,
absolutely without cause; or it must have been produced by
some external cause; or it must be self-existent. Now, to arise
out of nothing, absolutely without any cause, has been
already shown to be a plain contradiction. To have been
produced by some external cause, cannot possibly be true of
every thing; but something must have existed eternally and
independently, as has likewise been shown already. It re
mains, therefore, that that being which has existed independ
ently from eternity mtist of necessity be self-existent. Now,
to be self-existent is not to be produced by itself; for that is an
express contradiction. But it is, (which is the only idea we can
frame of self-existence; and without which, the word seems to
have no signification at all;) it is, I say, to exist by an absolute
necessity originally in the nature of the thing itself: And this
necessity must be antecedent; not, indeed, in time, to the
existence of the being itself, because that is eternal; but it
must be antecedent in the natural order of our ideas, to our
supposition of its being; that is, this necessity must not barely
be consequent upon our supposition of the existence of such
a being; (for then it would not be a necessity absolutely such
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in itself, nor be the ground or foundation of the existence of
any thing, being on thecontrary only a consequent of it;) but
it must antecedently force itself upon us, whether we will or
no, even when we are endeavouring to suppose that no such
being exists. (Clarke, Demonstration, 18)
Clarke's argument demands a necessarily existent being. Even if the
universe is eternal, it cannot meet this criterion.

^ The Eternity of the World ^
At least as far back as Aristotle the idea that the world itself may be
eternal was seen as compatible with the argument to an unmoved mover
or an uncaused cause. Indeed, it was the theological doctrine of the
created world that had to be made to fit into the framework of the
argument. Thomas Aquinas clearly argued that the existence of an
imcaused cause was a conclusion demanded by the existence of the
world, whether the world is of eternal duration or created. According
to Aqtiinas, the doctrine of creation is just that, a doctrinal belief based
on faith in a precept of revelation. Aquinas believed that the world was
created, and thus not eternal, but he did not think this fact could be
readily demonstrated rationally.
[T]hat the world began is an object of faith, but not of
demonstration or science. And it is useful to consider this,
lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith,
should bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to give
occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such
grounds we believe things that are of faith.
If the world was created and thus not eternal, it seems self evident to
Aquinas that it has a creator, a cause outside itself. But, even if we set
aside a belief in the creation of the world as a temporal event, the
existence of the world still demands explanation. Indeed, Aquinas is
very interested in assuring his theological audience that an eternal world
is compatible with its creation by God. He wrote.
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[T]he efficient cause, which acts by motion, of necessity
precedes its effect in time; because the effect is only in the end
of the action, and every agent must be the principle of action.
But if the action is instantaneous and not successive, it is not
necessary for the maker to be prior to the thing made in
duration, as appears in the case of illumination. Hence they
say that it does not follow necessarily if God is the active
cause of the world, that He should be prior to the world in
duration; because creation, by which he produced the world,
is not a successive change.^

Samuel Clarke understands this all very well. For Clarke, as for
Aquinas, the creation of the world in time is a matter of faith in
revelation.
That the material world is not self-existent or necessarilyexisting, but the product of some distinct superior agent, may
(as I have already shown) be strictly demonstrated by bare
reason against the most obstinate atheist in the world. But the
time when the world was created, or whether its creation was,
properly speaking, in time, is not so easy to demonstrate
strictly by bare reason, (as appears from the opinions of many
of the ancient philosophers concerning that matter;) but the
proof of it can be taken only from revelation. (Clarke,
Demonstration, 34)
Whether or not the world is created in time, or eternal, makes no
difference to his argument. Consequently Cleanthes's supposition that
once you have given an account of all the causes in an eternal chain you
need give no more, that if the world is eternal it demands no more
explanation, would be unconvincing to him. Clarke notes this clearly.
The question between us and the atheists is not whether the
world can possibly have been eternal, but whether it can

' Thomas Aquinas, SurriTm Theologica, Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican
Province (Westminster: Christian Classics, 1948), Part 1, Question 46, Article 2.
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possibly be the original, independent self-existing being?which is a very different question. (Clarke, Demonstration,28)
Even an eternally existing world demands an explanation in the form
of a necessarily existing being. As the universe does not exist necessar
ily, there must be something other than the universe which does exist
necessarily.
Of course this raises the question of why Clarke is so certain that
the world cannot be the necessary being. Typically, he spells out his
position quite clearly. First, the only true idea of a self-existent being
is the idea of a being whose nonexistence is a contradiction. Second, it
is a contradiction to assert that there is no being which possesses selfexistence, a fact that we have already explored. Third, we do not come
to this concept of a self-existent being by contemplating our idea of
divinity, as the Cartesians suppose, but by considering the existence of
the universe and inquiring after its cause. Fourth, the material universe
cannot be the necessary being.
For whether we consider the form of the world, with the
disposition and motion of its parts, or whether we consider
the matter of it, as such, without respect to its present form,
every thing in it,—both the whole and every one of its parts,
their situation and motion, the form and also the matter, are
the most arbitrary and dependent things, and the farthest
removed from necessity, that can possibly be imagined. A
necessity indeed of fitness, that is, a necessity that things
should be as they are, in order to the well-being of the whole,
there may be in all these things: but an absolute necessity of
nature in any of them, (which is what the atheist must
maintain,) there is not the least appearance of. If any man will
say in this sense, (as every atheist must do,) either that the
form of the world, or at least the matter and motion of it, is
necessary, nothing can possibly be invented more absurd.
(Clarke, Demonstration, 28)
Now, one might say that Hume would clearly disagree with many
of Clarke's claims at this point. Indeed, Hume famously argued in An
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding that it makes no sense to
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make the claim of necessity in regards to any being, whether that is God
or the universe. Whatever exists may not exist. No negation of fact
involves a contradiction. To even speak of a necessarily existing being
is, for Hume, absurd. Clarke, Hume would no doubt say, is looking for
a chimera, an existent thing whose existence is necessary, something
that cannot not be. Hume, therefore, would not take the discussion in
the direction of arguing for the necessity of the universe, but would
rather deny the very quest for necessity. The existence of any being can
only be demonstrated by appeal to its causes or effects, and these are
available only through experience. Only experience can show us the
nature of cause and effect and allow us to infer the existence of one
thing from another.
Hxune's criticism of rational necessity does not quite get at what
Clarke is concerned with, however. Like Hume, Clarke is himself
suspicious of any a priori attribution of necessity. The issue, for Clarke,
seems to be much less about logical necessity (as in the Cartesian proofs
and in Hume's rejection of necessity) and much more about a need to
end explanation in self explanation. He argues, in other words, that we
can know that the universe is neither self-existent nor necessary because
it is not self explanatory. For Clarke necessary means self-explanatory,
and he believes that there are straightforward reasons why the universe
is not self-explanatory.
Specifically, Clarke gives four reasons why the universe itself
cannot be self-explanatory and must, therefore, have its origins in
something that is. He frames these reasons around an issue that he
rightly sees to be critical to the difference of opinion between atheists
and theists, the question of the intelligence of the necessary being.
Clarke claims the following.
I: The cause must always be more excellent than the effect.
11: The existence of intelligent human beings demands
explanation in an intelligent cause.
ni: The variety, order, beauty, contrivance, and fitness of the
natural order can only be explained by intelligent purpose.
IV: Even unintelligent figure and motion could not exist
without an intelligent cause.
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Clarke's position is that the universe is not self-explanatory because its
explanation demands an intelligent cause. Hume's challenge is to show
how the universe can exist without recourse to such an intelligent cause.
Hume must show that, in this sense, the universe is self-explanatory, or
at least that its existence does not demand explanation outside itself, and
thus is self-existent or "necessary."

^ Cause and Effect ^
Clarke's first reason to reject the necessity of the universe's existence is
based on the claim that any cause must be greater than its effects. This
Aristotelian understanding of causation came to Christian fruition in
the work of Thomas Aquinas, who was also careful to invoke it in his
attempt to establish the existence of God. According to Thomas, our
ability to compare resemblances of qualities is possible only because of
the existence of a maximum of such qualities. The maximum of any
perfection is the cause of all things within that genus. Aquinas wrote:
[W]hatever perfection exists in an effect must be found in the
effective cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal
agent—as when man produces man; or in a more eminent
degree, if it is an equivocal agent—thus in the sun is the
likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power.
(Aquinas, Summa, Part 1, Question 4, Article 2)
Consequently, while the existence of intelligence in individual humans
may be explained univocally through other human beings as cause, this
cannot account for intelligence itself. But just as the cause of one
intelligent being demands explanation in another intelligent being, so
the cause of intelligence demands explanation in intelligence. The cause
must be equal to or greater than the effect. Or, according to Clarke,
since "things" have various kinds of powers, and very different
excellencies and degrees of perfection, it must needs be, that, in the
order of causes and effects, the cause must always be more excellent
than the effect (Clarke, Demonstration, 47).
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Based on this classical understanding of causality, Clarke makes
two other claims. First, he simply applies his claim about causation to
the necessarily ejdstent being:
Consequently the self-existent being, whatever that be
supposed to be, must of necessity (being the original of all
things) contain in itself the sum and highest degree of all the
perfections of all things: not because that which is self-existent
must therefore have all possible perfections; (for this, though
most certainly true in itself, yet cannot be so easily demon
strated a priori^ but because it is impossible that any effect
should have any perfection, which was not in the cause. For,
if it had, then that perfection would be caused by nothing;
which is a plain contradiction. (Clarke, Demonstration, 47)
Then, in order to seal the deal, Clarke argues that because the universe
contains intelligence, presumably in the form of human beings, the
cause of the universe must be intelligent. The universe itself cannot be
the necessarily existent being because, even though it contains intelli
gence, it is not itself intelligent. Therefore, there necessarily exists a
necessarily intelligent cause of the universe. This is the very definition
of God.
Now an unintelligent being, it is evident, cannot be indued
with all the perfections of all things in the world; because
intelligence is one of those perfections. All things, therefore,
cannot arise from an unintelligent original; and consequently
the self-existent being, must, of necessity, be intelligent.
(Clarke, Demonstration, 47)
The only way that Clarke can imagine anyone rejecting his argument
is if they also reject either the existence of intelligence in the universe,
something he cannot bring himself to imagine, or the nature of
intelligence as a perfection, something he is prepared to argue for
aggressively. What he doesn't see is that a much more serious challenge
will come from Hume concerning the very nature of causal logic.
Hume, of course, offered a sustained and serious challenge to this
classical understanding of causation. In place of a priori claims about
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cause and effect, claims like the one made by Clarke and Aquinas,
Hume argues that we must not attribute any more to the cause and
eHect relationship than experience allows. Unfortunately for our
epistemic certainty, this is not much. We do not experience causation,
we rather habitually attribute a causal relationship to objects or events
that are perceived in constant conjunction. Consequently, here we
cannot speak with certainty, only with a probability whose value is
dependent upon the number of observations and the similarity of
objects and events. As Hume writes, "These two propositions are far
from being the same, I have found that such an object has always been
attended with such an effect, and I forsee, that other objects, which are,
in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects."'' In other
words, instead of holding, like Clarke, that we can clearly know certain
facts concerning a thing's cause, Hume is demonstrating that we can
know no more about the cause than the effects will allow. One cannot
simply claim that a cause must always be greater than its effect. On the
contrary, the only way we can conjecture concerning an unknown
cause is if we have past experience of relevant constant conjunction, and
then only if the past experience is similar to the present.
Hume's Philo clearly takes this line of argument against Demea
and Cleanthes in the Dialogues. In Part II he describes situations that
satisfy the Humean criteria of repetitive observations and similarity of
circumstance.
That a stone will fall, that fire will burn, that the earth has
solidity, we have observed a thousand and a thousand times;
and when any new instance of this nature is presented, we
draw without hesitation the accustomed inference. The exact
similarity of the cases gives us a perfect assurance of a similar
event; and a stronger evidence is never desired or sought after.
Then Philo presents cases that do not meet the criteria.
After having experienced the circtilation of the blood in
human creatures, we make no doubt that it takes place in
Titius and Maevius: but from its circulation in frogs and
fishes, it is only a presumption, though a strong one, from

* David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Section 4, Part n.
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analogy, that it tahes place in men and other animals. The
analogical reasoning is much weaker, when we infer the
circulation of the sap in vegetables from our experience, that
the blood circulates in animals; and those, who hastily
followed that imperfect analogy, are found, by more accurate
experiments, to have been mistaken.

All of which points to a general principle of causal inference, based not
on a priori reasoning concerning causality, but based on experience:
[WJherever you depart, in the least, from the similarity of the
cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may at
last bring it to a very weak analogy, which is confessedly
liable to error and uncertainty.
Based on the criteria of similarity and repeatability that Philo/
Hume advocates, we can see that, in contrast to Clarke's very bold
claims, very little can be said about the cause of the universe. Unlike
houses or watches, of which we may have many experiences to call
upon, we have no experiences related to the origins of the universe.
Any experience we do cite will therefore have to be considered and
evaluated in terms of its similarity to the present case. With this
liimtation in mind we must admit that similarities between the universe
and any thing, either natural being or human artifact, is extremely and
damningly limited. In words reminiscent of those spoken by YHWH
to Job, Philo asks rather pointed questions.
Can you pretend to show any such similarity between the
fabric of a house, and the generation of a universe? Have you
ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles the first
arrangement of the elements? Have worlds ever been formed
under your eye? and have you had leisure to observe the
whole progress of the phenomenon, from the first appearance
of order to its final consummation? If you have, then cite
your experience, and deliver your theory.
Clarke argues to an intelligent cause of the universe because he
assumes that we know something important about the nature of
causation itself, a cause must be equal to or greater than its effect.
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Hume, in his own name and as the voice of Philo, denies that we have
this knowledge about causation. What we know about causation we
know from experience. Without experience we have no knowledge. It
is not enough to say that because the universe contains intelligence its
cause must itself be intelligent. Without experience of the causes of
universes, or things very similar to universes, we cannot make such a
claim. Clarke claims that the universe cannot be self-explanatory
because it demands an intelligent cause, something we know from our
general knowledge of the nature of causation. Hume denies that we
have such general knowledge of causal relationships. He does not in
this way propose an internal explanation for the existence of the
universe, but he does argue that its existence does not demand explana
tion in an intelhgent cause.

^ The Argument from Intelligence ^
Hume does not leave his challenge to Clarke's argument at the level of
general causal epistemology, however, but also engages Clarke on the
details of the causal explanation for intelligence. As we have seen,
Clarke imagined that the only possible challenges to his argument were
the nonsensical claim that the universe does not contain intelligence and
the related, though not quite as self evidently mistaken, claim that
intelligence is not a perfection. Hume's radical assault on Clarke's
understanding of causation allows him to make another unsuspected
criticism, however. Namely, Hume is able to say that if we do not
know a priori that a cause must be greater than or equal to its effect, but
if our knowledge of a thing's cause is related to our experiences, then we
can, carefully proportioning our conclusions to the evidence, make
some hesitant and speculative attempts at exploring the possible causes
of the universe.
Specifically, Hume's Philo argues that when we develop causal
hypotheses based on experience rather than on a priori assumptions we
may come to some interesting conclusions decidedly different from
those of Clarke. In Part VII, Philo argues that the universe may be said
to have more similarity to an animal or vegetable than a human artifact.
He says.
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The world plainly resembles more an animal or a vegetable,
than it does a watch or knitting loom. Its cause, therefore, it
is more probable, resembles the cause of the former. The
cause of the former is generation or vegetation. The cause,
therefore, of the world, we may infer to be some thing similar
or analogous to generation or vegetation.

When Demea responds to this suggestion it is to assert that such natural
order still demands explanation in intelligent design. But, observes
Philo, this is to beg the very question at hand. Indeed, Philo argues not
only that the order present in the universe may have arisen from natural
generation, but also that intelligence itself may have arisen from natural
generation.
Once we shift our understanding of cause and effect from the
classical one shared by Aquinas and Clarke, to the modern one of
Hume and Philo, it is no longer self evident that "an effect must not
have any perfection that is not in the cause." Philo, therefore, can argue
based on constant conjunction observed in similar circumstances, that
we might have reason to speculate that the intelligence in the universe,
namely human intelligence, is the result of non-intelhgent causes. Philo
argues,
I have at least some faint shadow of experience, which is the
utmost that can ever be attained in the present subject.
Reason, in innumerable instances, is observed to arise from
the principle of generation, and never to arise from any other
principle.
While Philo does not elaborate on this claim it seems quite clear what
it is he means. While it is the case that we do observe order arising
from reason, in the case of human artifacts, as well as from natural
generation, in the case of everything else, it is also true that we do
observe reason arising exclusively from natural generation. This is
precisely the way we see it in human intelligence, which arises from
natural processes. Unlike the conclusion forced on Clarke by the
classical understanding of causal knowledge, Hume's understanding of
causation pushes us in a very different direction.
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This important shift in the understanding of causal logic is not the
only weapon in Hume's arsenal, however, and he takes the time in the
Dialogues not only to pull the rug out from imder Clarke's causal
presuppositions, but also to engage Clarke on his own terms. Clarke,
we may remember, suggested that one might object to his conclusions
if one rejected either the existence of intelligence in the tmiverse (a
position he thought to be ridiculous), or if one rejected the claim that
intelligence is a perfection. Hume, and his character Philo, reject the
second claim and, in so doing, reject at least some aspects of the first.
If we assume Clarke's claim to be true that the cause of any
perfection or quality must itself possess that perfection or quahty then
his argument carries some weight, but only if intelligence is such a
perfection. Clarke put it so:
If perception or intelligence be any real distinct quality, or
perfection, and not a mere effect or composition of unintelli
gent figure and motion, then beings indued with perception
or consciousness can never possibly have arisen purely out of
that which itself had no such quality as perception or con
sciousness; because nothing can ever give to another any
perfection which it hath not either actually in itself, or at
least in a higher degree. (Clarke, Demonstration, 47)
And again.
He therefore that will affirm intelligence to be the effect of a
system of unintelligent matter in motion, must either affirm
intelligence to be a mere name or external denomination of
certain figures and motions, and that it differs from unintelli
gent figures and motions, no otherwise than as a circle or
triangle differs from a square; which is evidently absurd: or
else he must suppose it to be a real distinct quality, arising
from certain motions of a system of matter not in itself
intelligent; and then this no less evidently absurd consequence
would follow, that one quality inherred in another; for, in
that case, not the substance itself, the particles of which the
system consists, but the mere mode, the particular mode of
motion and figure, would be intelligent.
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But, of course, it is something like this that Hume does propose.
When we examine our experience of "intelligence"—namely our
consciousness—we find that it is more like "a name or external
denomination of certain figures and motions" than like the perfection
or quality of Clarke's description. Furthermore, once Hume rejects
Clarke's classical account of causation then, as we have seen, it is not
absurd to suppose that intelligence, such as it is, has its cause in nonintelligent matter. Philo argues that experience does not really discover
any qualitative differences between mind and matter. "A difference of
age, of the disposition of the body, of weather, of food, of company, of
books, of passions; any of these particulars, or others more minute, are
sufficient to alter the curious machinery of thought, and communicate
to it very different movements and operations" (Part VD). Hume's
understanding of causation allows him to embrace positions that Clarke
found nonsensical. Experience does not demonstrate that intelligence
can only have its origins in intelligence. Rather it shows that intelli
gence may be the effect of the same kinds of material, and nonintelligent, causes as other elements of the natural world.

^ The Argument from Design ^
Clarke, as the reader has hopefully realized by now, believed in giving
multiple arguments in support of his positions. In addition to his claim
that the universe cannot be self-explanatory because the presence of
intelligence in the universe demands an intelligent cause, he also argues
that the order of the universe points to an intelligent designer. He
presents his version of the teleological argument first by appeal to our
experience of the well ordered nature of the world.
That the self-existent and original cause of all things is an
intelligent being, appears abundantly from the excellent
variety, order, beauty, and wonderful contrivance and fitness
of all things in the world to their proper and respective ends.
(Clarke, Demonstration, 53)
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Then, he presents the options, both good and bad, that naight be
available to explain such an empirical fact.
Since therefore things are thus, it must unavoidably be
granted (even by the most obstinate atheist,) either that all
plants and animals are originally the work of an intelligent
being, and created by him in time; or that, having been from
eternity in the same order and method they are now in, they
are an eternal effect of an eternal intelligent cause, continually
exerting his infinite power and wisdom; or else, that, without
any self-existent original at all, they have been derived one
from another in an eternal succession, by an infinite progress
of dependent causes. The first of these three ways is the
conclusion we assert: the second, (so far as the cause of
atheism is concerned,) comes to the very same thing: and the
third I have already shown, (in my proof of the second
general head of this discourse,) to be absolutely impossible,
and a contradiction.
Here, Clarke offers an argument of the form offered by Thomas
Aquinas as the fifth way to the existence of God, as well as by Butler,
and later by Paley. Either the order of the world is designed and created
or designed and eternal, but it cannot be explained without recourse to
an intelligent cause.
As an examination of the teleological argument would take this
essay somewhat far beyond the question at hand, I will only remind the
reader that Hume offers an extremely critical appraisal of this argument
within the context of the Dialogues. His discussions of the origins of
complex order are very similar to his discussion of the origins of
intelligence. Suffice it to say, when Philo employs Hume's criteria for
determining causation to the question of "design" his conclusions are far
different from those of Clarke. Perhaps most important is Philo's claim
that the order observed in the world is often given different causal
explanations in ordinary circumstances. There are cases in which order
is an indication of human design and intelligence, such as with watches
and other artifacts. It should not be forgotten, however, that most of
the order which we observe in the world around us is not the product
of human intelligence, but of natural development. This, of course.
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includes the order of vegetable life, the ordered growth of human
beings, and all of the natural order that Clarke thinks points to
intelligent design.
Without examining Philo's claim that much of the order in the
natural world is defective and his assessment of this fact as an argument
against a perfect intelligence as cause and designer, we can say that
Hume once again met Clarke's challenge. Complex natural order does
not demand explanation in intelligence. Consequently, Clarke cannot
say, based on the presence of that order, that the world may be eternal,
but not self explanatory or necessary.

^ The Argument from Motion ^
Finally, Clarke argues that even if we grant that both complex order
and intelligence may have arisen without the benefit of an intelligent
cause, the universe, even the eternal universe, is not self-explanatory and
therefore not necessary. Even if Hume is right about the legitimacy of
natural causes for intelligence and order, there is something about the
tmiverse that demands explanation in an intelligent cause. Clarke
writes.
Supposing it was possible that the form of the world, and all
the visible things contained therein, with the order, beauty,
and exquisite fitness of their parts; nay, supposing that even
intelligence itself, with consciousness and thought, in all the
beings we know, could possibly be the result or effect of mere
unintelligent matter, figure, and motion; (which is the most
unreasonable and impossible supposition in the world;) yet
even still there would remain an undeniable demonstration,
that the self-existent being, (whatever it be supposed to be,)
must be intelligent. (Clarke, Demonstration, 55)
Motion itself, Clarke argues, which is certainly a necessary
prerequisite for the order and intelligence in the universe, is only
explainable in terms of intelligence. It is clear that there is motion in
the world. This motion either has a beginning in time or is eternal. If
the motion began in time this motion must have its cause in an
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intelligent being, because matter could never of itself begin to move. If
motion is eternal it is either caused by some eternal necessary being, it
must itself be necessary and self-existent, or without either external or
internal necessary cause, it must have simply existed in eternal succes
sion. The first possibility clearly points us to an intelligent cause, and
thus a deity. The third possibility does not get to the question at
hand, for even if motion is eternal in duration, if not self-explanatory,
it demands external explanation. If however, the motion of the
universe is itself necessary and self-existent then it is a contradiction for
any material thing to be at rest. Absurdly, it would also be the case that
since the supposed motion is necessary and self-existent, then motion
would be in all directions at the same time, resulting in a state of
perpetual rest. Since it is nonsense for a proposition to lead to two
contradictory conclusions, the proposition itself must be false.
In contrast, if we propose an intelligent cause for the motion of the
universe, we find a clear explanation. We regularly observe that the
actions of the intelligent will result in the transformation of physical
bodies from a state of rest to a state of movement. This happens
whenever we decide to move our hand or speak a word. Thus move
ment can be explained by intelligent cause. The movement of the
universe therefore demands explanation in an intelligent cause.
From hence it follows again, that the material world cannot
possibly be the original self-existent being: For, since the selfexistent being is demonstrated to be intelligent, and the
material world plainly is not so, it follows that the material
world cannot possibly be self-existent. (Clarke, Demonstra
tion, 57)
Hume's response to Clarke on this point is along the lines that we
see throughout the Dialogues. In doing so, however, he also raises an
important alternative to the teleological argument andits insistence that
adaptation and order imply intelligence. Philo, appealing to the
Epicurean scenario, suggests that if the universe is eternal, then it is
likely that in the course of eternity every possible occurrence of
combinations, including this one, with organisms fitted just as they are,
must occur. Indeed, he goes on to argue, that the more stable combina-

76

1650-1850

tions of matter will remain in place, while the less stable will fall apart.
As Philo proposes In Part VIU,
Thus the universe goes on for many ages in a continued
succession of chaos and disorder. But is it not possible that it
may settle at last, so as not to lose its motion and active force
yet so as to preserve an uniformity of appearance, amidst the
continual motion and fluctuation of its parts? This we find
to be the case with the universe at present.
Demea responds to this hypothesis with an objection based on the
impossibility of matter acquiring motion of itself, without any
voluntary agent or first mover. Once again, however, Philo responds
to Demea's a priori claim that motion must be caixsed by intelligence by
insisting that we must wait on experience. And, while experience does
give us examples of motion seemingly being caused by intelligence or
will, it also gives us examples, many more examples, of motion
occurring without inteUigent cause. To focus on one set of cases,
indeed the minority of cases, and to ignore the rest is to neglect
important examples. Philo says to Demea,
Motion, in many instances, from gravity, from elasticity,
from electricity, begins in matter, without any known
voluntary agent; and to suppose always, in these cases, an
unknown voluntary agent, is mere hypothesis; and hypothesis
attended with no advantages. The beginning of motion in
matter itself is as conceivable a priori as its communication
from mind and intelligence.
Once again, Hume's argument is decisive. Motion observed in the
universe does not demand explanation in an intelligent cause.

^ Conclusion: Hume and the Eternity
of the World ^
Though its dialogue form may sometimes hide the organization and
focus of Hume's argument, and though the use of fictional stand-ins for
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real life theorists may sometimes distract the reader from the direct
assault that Hume marshaled against those who sought to demonstrate
the existence of God, it is clear from a careful reading of the Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion that Hume's adversaries are not anony
mous and his argument is not disorganized and scattershot. Indeed,
Hume mounted a serious criticism of the arguments developed by
Samuel Clarke that addressed both the underlying assumptions and
specific details of Clarke's attempt at a demonstration of the existence
of God.
By calling into question Clarke's causal logic and by insisting that
we stick to experience rather than a priori theorizing, Hume shows that
the conclusions that centuries of philosophers and divines had been
assured of were flawed and mistaken. This is strikingly seen in the
differing levels of significance given to the possibility of the eternity of
the world by Clarke and Hume. For Clarke, the possibility of an
eternal universe was of no significance for his theory. If the universe
has always existed it still must be explained by a cause outside itself.
Why is this so? Because the universe is not self-explanatory, and thus
not necessary. Why is it not so? Because the presence of (human)
intelligence in the universe demands an intelligent cause. Why is this?
Because a cause must always be greater than its effect; because an effect
can not contain any perfection that is not in the cause. Why not? We
know this by the very nature of causation.
It is at this point, of course, that Hume is most significant. We do
not know this by the nature of causation. We do not know the nature
of causation. What we can say about causation, we can say based only
on experience and we can say only in terms of probability. With such
in mind there is no reason to say that the universe cannot be selfexplanatory and thus necessary. The existence of the universe does not
demand the existence of an intelligent cause. The world may be eternal.
If so, then no more explanation is needed, or possible. It is possible for
us to stop with naturalistic explanations.
The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion stands as a critically
important modern work. It does more than lay to rest (philosophically,
if not socially) the teleological and cosmological arguments for the
existence of God. It does more than clear the way for the naturalistic
explanations of the universe that we see in contemporary physics and
for the naturalistic explanations of the order of life that we seen in
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Darwinian theory. It is one of those rare documents that represents a
pivotal point in the history of ideas. Hume, in the Dialogues and
beyond the Dialogues, so changed our understanding of causation that
it is nearly impossible for most of us to think in the old way, and nearly
impossible for us to understand how anyone ever did.

